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The Play of Power and Politics in Innovation and HRM

ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the human resource management (HRM) practices involved in the implementation of
a process innovation approach to product development (concurrent engineering (CE)) in the Australian
subsidiary of a multinational firm engaged in military defence electronics. According to the research
literature, almost all aspects of managing product development under a CE approach are linked to people
management. Yet in this particular case, other than project team structure, the prescriptive HRM
dimensions of CE were conspicuously absent in the implementation process. This absence is explained by
the play of power and politics involving stakeholders analysed over an 18 month period. The implications
of this analysis for understanding the embedded, interdependent and political nature of HRM and process
innovation are addressed.
Keywords: innovation, HRM, politics, power, concurrent engineering

INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt about the importance of innovation. As markets become increasingly globalised and
competitive and the pace of technological change grows, organizations have to compete not only in terms
of quality and cost, but also in terms of time-to-market and innovativeness of their products (Dougherty
and Hardy, 1996; Mavondo, Chimhanzi and Stewart, 2004). In their review of the relevant literatures, de
Leede and Looise (2005) found that most approaches to innovation and its management in an
organizational setting entail an important role for HRM. Further, while there has been a significant
amount of attention directed by innovation management scholars to such issues (e.g. human resource
development, rewards, career management and team building), HRM researchers have tended to ignore
innovation, particularly at the project level. This paper seeks to redress this.
Our study involved an in-depth processual analysis over an 18-month period of a project that sought to
introduce concurrent engineering (CE) - a particular approach to product innovation used in many
manufacturing industries - in the Australian subsidiary of a European manufacturer of military electronics
systems (Eurotech Industries). Our specific focus was to acquire a deeper understanding of the role of
HRM practices in CE implementation processes over time, from both line management and HRM
specialist perspectives. Shortly after the study commenced, it became apparent that HRM was receiving
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scant attention in implementing CE, contrary to CE methodology stipulations. We found that the play of
organizational power and politics involving various actors in and around the CE process innovation
project had a significant bearing on the limited involvement of HRM. This led us to examine the literature
on HRM and organizational power and politics to acquire a deeper understanding of our field
observations. However, this literature was somewhat limited, and it was necessary to draw upon the more
generic literature on power and politics, as well as that related to innovation. This paper is structured in a
way that facilitates a systematic discussion of the above issues.

PROCESS INNOVATION - CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
Concurrent engineering seeks to achieve a balance between organizational, technological and human
factors in the new product development process through realising cross-functional integration (i.e.
through high levels of co-ordination, co-operation, communication), the integration of design (i.e. by
considering product life cycle issues considered up-front), and a high level concurrence between project
tasks in terms of overlaps and parallel activities (Haddad, 1996; Clausing, 1994; Fleischer and Liker,
1997). Yet, the processual and complex nature of CE implementation remains poorly understood, and
remains an ambiguous and vague concept with considerable interpretive flexibility (Abrahamson, 1995).
This is consistent with observations that our knowledge about organization-level innovation is
‘fragmentary’ (Fagerberg, 2005: 20) and that this is due to ‘a failure to study innovation within the
context of meaning, knowledge and understanding of the organisation as a key unit of analysis’ (Storey
and Salaman, 2005: 7). While the emphasis in the CE literature has been on technology, it has
increasingly been recognised that the human resource dimension is decisive for its successful constitution
and implementation. Despite this, no in-depth studies have analysed the role of human resource
management in CE implementation (Schubert and Couchman, 1998). The CE literature, indeed the
innovation literature generally (Fagerberg, 2005; de Leede and Looise, 2005), remains shallow with
regard to the role of HRM, despite its apparent significance. Where there have been explanations of the
role of HRM in CE and product innovation, these have been essentially universalistic and prescriptive
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(Atuahene-Gima, 1996; Couchman, Badham, and Zanko, 1999). This neglect of HRM would also seem to
be reflected in organizational practice, as noted by Bondarouk and Looise (2005) in their study of
information technology implementation.
HRM and CE
According to the research literature, there are a number of key areas where HRM policies and practices
could support and facilitate CE and for which CE may have significant implications respectively. These
include: performance measurement and reward, training and development, selection and staffing, job
design, career management, and employee relations (Campion and Higgs, 1995). According to its
contingent nature, there is no "one best set" of HRM practices for CE. Different cross-functional
arrangements may require different HRM arrangements (Zanko, Couchman, Badham, Schubert and
Zainuddin, 1998). For example, the decision for a cross-functional team (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992)
will be more complex, resource intensive and risky from a HRM perspective than a liaison role.
While the role of HRM as a specialist function has not been addressed in the CE literature (Zanko et al.,
1998), a number of HR issues have attracted attention that are directly concerned with cross-functional
integration, such as team building (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987), team leadership (Susman and Rayl,
1999), team processes and performance (Hauptman and Hirji, 1996). Gerwin and Susman (1996) argue
that the establishment of cross-functional teams is no guarantee for cross-functional integration, if it is not
buttressed by supportive recruitment, training and other team-oriented HRM policies and practices.
It has been claimed that the HR issues identified in the above studies ‘are treated broadly in isolation from
other HRM activities; no account is made of the need for functional integration - where HRM program
areas need to be treated and linked as a systemically related whole’ (Zanko et al., 1998: 132). Moreover,
HRM issues in the wider context of a CE integration effort have been broadly neglected. No detailed
research has been conducted, for example, on the HR implications for functional areas with the
establishment of cross-functional teams (such as the loss of expertise for the function, absence coverage,
responsibilities for career management, or professional development).
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The approach taken in this study reflects the view of HRM as a specialist function and organization-wide
activity. It finds expression through HR strategy, policies and practices, and is thus represented by all of
the HRM stakeholder groups in line with Boxall and Purcell’s (2003) contextually embedded notion of
HRM that covers all workforce groups, involves line and specialist managers, incorporates a variety of
management styles, and considers individual and collective aspects of work and employment.

CASE STUDY
Methodology
This investigation was based on a single longitudinal processual case study of a company’s attempts to
define and implement CE, with a particular focus on the role of HRM therein. The aim was to gather rich
contextual data over time in order to grasp the dynamics of the CE change process and so this was studied
over a period of 18 months.
Yin's (1989) case study framework, guided the development of the case research design. Data collection
was mainly qualitative and accumulated from: participant observation, interviews with company
representatives, and public and proprietary company documents. The observation program consisted of
regular visits to the company over the 18 month period, totaling about 140 days, and enabled a deep
insight into the daily routines and subtle organisational phenomena that shaped the CE implementation
process (Dawson, 1994; 2003). The collection of observational data was complemented by formal and
informal interviews with key players in the CE and change implementation. The data were subjected to a
systematic qualitative analysis following ‘three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display,
and conclusion drawing/verification’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10). The three independent sources of
evidence (interviews, observations and documents) enabled the contextualisation, cross-check and crossvalidation of data (Stake, 2005).
Eurotech Industries and CE Context
Eurotech Industries was a medium-sized company, originally established in New South Wales, Australia
in the 1950s. From 1990, it operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of a European multinational
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corporation. Its core business was defence electronics. Formally, each function and project within
Eurotech was jointly managed by a Technical Manager and a Business Administration Manager. This
"double-head" structure had been imposed on Eurotech Industries by its German parent. It was
accompanied by the introduction of a second managing director, a representative from the parent
company, the Managing Director - Business Administration. This second Managing Director effectively
had deputy status. The final decision-making power rested, as before, with the de facto CEO of the
company, the Technical Managing Director (TMD).
The main decision-making body, the Executive Committee, was made up of the TMD, the Managing
Director - Business Administration, the Engineering Director, the Director of Quality Assurance, the
Manufacturing Director, the Director of Material Planning and Control, and the Finance Director. Sales
and Projects were represented on this Committee by the Technical Managing Director. Neither the
Projects Executive nor any individual Project Manager was a member of the Executive Committee. The
head of the HR Department was neither a director nor a member of the Executive Committee.
The organization’s culture was described by company representatives as "laid a bit backwards, living still
a bit in the past" (Business Administration Manager, Engineering Department). This attitude was
accompanied by a focus on individual performance in contrast to teamwork. Another prevailing
behaviour pattern was a so-called “culture of blame”. This could be seen in the low tolerance towards
failure, and proved a barrier in the implementation of CE and the overall change process. The strong
engineering background of many employees was another factor that determined Eurotech Industries'
culture. About one third of the 360 plus staff (and most managers) were professional engineers. Change
agents in Eurotech Industries were mostly technologists.
At the time of the study, Eurotech Industries was running about 20 product development projects of
various sizes, which were handled by 10 Project Managers. According to a Project Manager "big projects
have one full-time Project Manager. With small projects, one Project Manager can handle two to four
projects". But even the big development projects did not have a permanent project team, only an informal,
part-time staffed project management group. The product development process was marked by a lack of
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integrated thinking and action, with projects were being conducted in a conventional way, reflected in a
strong linear-sequential project process.
HRM in Eurotech Industries
HRM was fundamentally neglected in a specialist and generic organizational sense. The appointment of
the incumbent HR Manager in an essentially

‘clerk of works’ role (Tyson and Fell, 1986) – an

appointment considered to be an "historical accident" by a member of the Executive As mentioned earlier,
the HR Manager was neither a Director nor a member of the Executive Committee. The HR Department
had low status. None of its nine staff had a degree or other formal qualifications in personnel management
or HRM. The TMD consciously limited the HR Department to operational duties and welfare provision
and saw "HRM's role ... more in the soft factors, to look after them [employees]". The HR Department
had a short-term planning horizon, a low level of discretion and was subservient to line management. It
did not even meet the limited expectations of change project leaders and managers regarding its
contribution to certain HRM issues within the change program.
At the beginning of the initiatives put in train to improve Eurotech’s project-based product development
performance HRM activities were still of low importance to many line managers. These managers had not
recognised the value of HRM nor their own responsibility for it. They had little or no training or
qualification in HRM. Nevertheless, they felt confident about dealing with HR issues and considered their
efforts in this respect as sufficient. Yet internal surveys identified HRM as one of the weakest managerial
areas and showed that most managers in Eurotech Industries largely underestimated the complexity and
difficulty of HRM. Consequently, the company provided various training sessions on HRM and related
issues, and stimulated a continuous discussion of various HR topics. Line managers were more actively
involved with the initiation and management of the organizational and cultural change process. The TMD
claimed HRM to be of highest importance to the company and saw himself as a main stakeholder of
HRM, though he did not always act as such.
CE in Eurotech Industries
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All system development projects at the beginning of the case study were marked by time over-runs and
budget blow-outs. Following a comprehensive business analysis by external management consultants in
the year prior to the change initiative, the company identified a need to restructure its traditional design
and development process in order to sustain and strengthen its market position. Six individual projects
were set up under the umbrella of Eurotech’s Time Optimized Processes (TOP) program that had been
initiated by its European parent. CE was recommended and adopted as one of these, as a method for
increasing the timeliness and quality of development projects. The overall CE Project was formally given
the task of developing a concept for the restructuring of the design and development process based on CE
principles. Eight months after its inception, the CE Project Team proposed a CE "solution set" and the
selection of a CE Pilot Project. Four months later, the CE Project Team and senior management had
identified a Pilot Project and agreed on a timetable for its implementation.
The initial CE project team comprised five, then six members, including the team leader. The members
represented only a few downstream and upstream functions; all had a technical background. They were
mostly junior employees or contractors, who worked part-time on the project; they were not collocated.
Work on the project was not widely viewed as rewarding by the team. The CE Project Leader was a
systems engineer who reinforced the team's technical emphasis. He concentrated on tools, techniques and
procedures. Little attention was given to the organizational and HRM implications of CE, though other
team members repeatedly raised such issues. He had an authoritarian leadership style and lacked team
orientation.
Training was conducted at a stage when a pilot product development project had not yet been nominated.
The CE Project Team had not tested its proposed CE concept and, therefore, had no experience with its
actual application. In addition, senior management and the CE Project Team were still struggling to build
up a coherent vision of CE, a common understanding about what CE meant for Eurotech Industries. Many
organizational and HR related issues were raised in the training such as the future role of functional
managers, but remained unanswered.

8

The pilot product development project that was eventually selected for the application of CE, however,
was not an ideal case to trial the concept. This project was already at a stage where the conceptual design
was mostly completed. Thus, the "CE solution set" could not be fully applied, particularly in terms of
initial team-building, common goal setting or formulating a team charter. After one year, the CE Project
Team concluded that the outcome of the CE Project was rather modest. Although CE had not been fully
applied at the end of the investigation, the concept of CE had gained momentum. The proposed concept
conveyed a vision of the future development process that corresponded with Eurotech Industries' business
reorientation, an orientation towards teamwork and innovation.

EXPLAINING THIS DEVELOPMENT
How do we explain the course of the CE project and the ways in which the HRM issues were handled,
considered or excluded? The following looks at the influence of some of the key players as well as the
contextually influenced play of power in implementing CE.
The Players
Senior Management

According to the influential Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, senior
management initially classified the CE Project as a "first priority". Yet the history of the project appeared
to reveal otherwise. The Executive Committee failed to link CE into other change projects and initiatives,
in particular a major TOP project on Organizational and Cultural Change (OCC).

Its lower status

treatment by the executives was implicitly recognised throughout the organization. According to one CE
Project Team member, CE received “the most support from the least powerful people in the Executive
Committee”. The TMD did not take on its sponsorship, and its formal sponsor, the Engineering Director,
showed little interest. This was accompanied by similar degrees of disinterest and even mild opposition
from the other Directors. The CE Project remained very much an engineering project (focused on design
and development within projects). For a year, the TMD and other senior managers did not actively
support CE and the more far-reaching changes proposed by the CE Team.
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The TMD saw no major strategic role for HRM or its relevance for CE. This was most apparent in his
restriction of the role of the HR Department to one that was reactive to change. A few years earlier, the
previous HR manager had been on the Executive Committee and an active advisor to senior and middle
management. The successor HR Manager, appointed by the TMD, was neither a Director nor a member
of the Executive Committee.
Following the European parent-initiated TOP Program, the TMD proclaimed an increased interest in
HRM. It was particularly reflected in the establishment of the Organisational and Cultural Change Project
(OCC) that he decided to sponsor (yet appoint someone other than the HRM manager as its leader). The
TMD espoused a more strategic pursuit to HRM, as well as a move towards more a "sophisticated human
relations" style. Yet, when the OCC group recommended a strengthening of HRM strategy and the
department, the TMD opposed this and it did not happen.
Middle Management

A number of functional managers, with control over resources needed by projects and their managers, did
not participate in important CE meetings or training sessions nor send a respective substitute (e.g. Sales
and Marketing), nor provide a functional representative for the CE team, even after repeated requests by
the CE Project Leader. They did not enforce the participation of their subordinates on CE training nor
sufficiently empower the functional representatives on the Pilot Project. A general lack of interest was
accompanied by varying degrees of opposition in the face of potential threat.

Various documents

produced by the CE Project Team pointed to a reduction in the influence of the functions in projects and
their reorientation towards a supporting role in the development process.
In contrast to the Technical Directors and the functional managers under them, project managers were far
less powerful. They were "always begging and pleading" described the Director of Quality Assurance.
The CE Project Leader was a systems engineer who reinforced the team's technical emphasis. He was
young and inexperienced in dealing with HR issues and organizational politics, and failed to win over the
TMD, functional Heads or the OCC Project Leader as allies for CE. Instead of developing strong linkages

10

with the functions via the representatives at the CE Project Team, he dominated the CE Project Team. He
did not devolve responsibility and often suppressed ideas of team members in favour of his own views
that emphasised procedures and technical solutions. He did not consider the creation of an appropriate
infrastructure for CE with appropriate HRM policies and practices as within the scope of the CE Project.
On the Ground: The CE Project Team

A number of HRM related factors contributed to the modest CE outcome. One can be seen in the
composition and preparation of the CE Project Team. The CE Project Team members were mostly junior
employees with one more experienced contractor. They were allotted to the project by their respective
functional managers, all from engineering, although all main functions were asked to send a
representative. Moreover, the CE Pilot Project Team had not been sufficiently prepared. It was not
provided with any team-building training nor was it appropriately empowered. As a result, the CE
Project Team focused on technical problems and solutions.
The CE project team leader saw HRM issues largely as outside the purview of the CE Project. An
illustration of the resultant non-decision-making was his suppression of the team members' demands for
change (raised in the form of various HR and organizational issues such as the future scope of functional
managers or team rewards). These HR issues were not included in the minutes, agenda, project tasks or
the CE Project proposals. The CE Project Leader discussed the project proposals with senior
management. As these proposals only contained issues accepted by the CE Project Leader, he acted in a
gatekeeper role, and so exercised control over the agenda, keeping potential issues (e.g. future role of
functional managers) out of the political process. Apart from HRM issues such as team structure, team
training, and team meetings, the CE Team did not consider other HRM issues in any depth until one year
after the project commenced.
The Play
The consideration or lack of consideration, of HRM factors in the course of the project was largely
attributable to the complex intertwining of the actions of these players. Of crucial significance was not
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only the opposition to considering HRM issues in the CE project but the fragmented and misaligned
interests and perceptions of those supporting HRM.

On the one hand, for example, the actions of the

TMD in opposing strategic HRM was clearly influential in reducing the status, role and resources of the
HRM function, selecting a CE project manager and team with a low level of political credibility or HRM
expertise, and lack of formal sponsorship of the project or support in the face of disinterest or opposition
from other Directors.

On the other hand, the various perceptions of and interests in HRM were not

aligned. The TMD was at various times more or less committed to at least espousing a strategic HRM
approach. The CE Project Leader had some interest in team building and training, and exploring the idea
of cross-functional teamwork arrangements, yet failed to address many of the organisational issues that
needed to be solved to make this possible or carry out a political analysis or strategy to gain support from
the functional managers and departments. The CE Project Team, although inexperienced in this area,
increasingly gave voice to an interest in addressing a broader range of HRM factors, but this was given
very little consideration.
The actions of these organisational actors must, however, be set in their context. The ways in which they
framed the problems, the interests and intentions that they pursued, the information, skills and capabilities
that they had, the resources that they possessed, and their room for manoeuvre were all affected by
situational social and political forces.

The perceptions and actions of the TMD were at least in part

attributable to the traditional engineering culture of a company that had developed on the basis of its
technical knowledge and engineering expertise.

The establishment of a function dominated but

engineering project oriented matrix structure provided the context that shaped the interests and
perceptions of the Technical Directors, the functional managers, and the project team members
themselves. The lack of HRM knowledge, interest and skills on the part of such key players as the CE
project manager and his team was linked to the way in which career structures were established in the
company. The clash between the HRM aspirations of the OCC leader, the TMD, the HRM manager, the
CE project manager and the CE project team were also rooted in competing career structures and training.
Interaction between these different elements was revealed at a number of points. The CE project team
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took the opportunity of the absence of the CE project leader to discuss and advocate the need for a more
extensive range of HRM factors to be taken into consideration in the project, an activity that revealed the
responsibility of the CE project team leader in repressing consideration of such factors. That the TMD
and the rest of the Executive Team did not take up the recommendations for the strengthening of the
HRM function revealed the crucial role played by the senior management team in restricting such
considerations, even while formally espousing the need for a more strategic and proactive HRM
orientation. In order to capture the play of power that influenced the consideration of HRM factors in CE
at Eurotech, the complex interpersonal and situational dynamics involved need to be understood.

CONCLUSIONS
As noted earlier, there has been a lack of analysis of how HRM considerations are handled in innovation
projects. This case illustrates how such issues are dealt with, and reveals the key role that political factors
play in preventing the rhetorical HRM aspirations of innovation projects from being realised. What we
saw at Eurotech was a complex intertwining of active opposition by organisational actors with the
influence of embedded organisational constraints. In order to further our understanding of this
phenomenon, how is it best to explore and investigate such obstacles?
Organizational power and politics have been given scant treatment in the established HRM literature,
apart from a few notable exceptions (e.g. Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005); Al-Arkoubi and McCourt
(2004); Galang and Ferris (1997)). In terms of in depth treatments of the topic, one has probably to go
back to the now classic analyses of Legge (1978), and Townley (1994). These two analyses provide very
different intellectual perspectives that can be drawn upon to explore how politics and power affect the
manner in which HRM issues are considered (or excluded from consideration) in the course of
innovation. The essence of Legge’s (1978) argument is that human resource management, as both a
function and specialist department, requires power and influence in decision-making in order to
implement its policy and practice prescriptions, and so overcome the tendency to be neglected through
line management misunderstanding of the role of HRM, and perceptions of HRM departments as being
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out of touch with line management’s problems. In her focus on the conscious and active role of
organisational actors in the competition for resources, Legge's analysis is usefully supplemented by
Pettigrew's (1974: 27) exploration of how organisational specialists such as HRM professionals ‘do not
merely advise’ but ‘persuade, negotiate and exercise the power they can mobilise’. In so doing, he argues,
they utilise (or fail to utilise) five power sources: expertise; control over information; political access and
sensitivity; assessed stature; and the amount and kind of groups support given to the specialist by his (her)
colleagues in his (her) own and related specialist groups. The HRM professional, like other specialists,
needs to establish credibility if he or she is to be effective.
While Buchanan and Badham (1999) argue that such ‘power skills’ should be part of the skills of all
professional innovators, Townley’s (1994) work directs our attention to another dimension of politics and
power - the way in which the exercise of politics and power is embedded in the often taken-for-granted
organisational norms and arrangements, or discursive practices, within which the more open cut and
thrust of interest group politics is played out. It is this more ‘unobtrusive’ or ‘covert’ arena of power that
many analysts regard as absolutely essential for any thorough understanding of organisational politics
(Hardy, 1996; Lukes, 1974; Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998).
The above approaches draw our attention to the multi-dimensional nature of the political factors involved
in exploration of how many of the cross-functional HRM issues raised by innovations are not taken up
and considered. This character is further captured and extended by Hardy (1996) and elaborated in her
work with Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) on how a systematic exploration of the failure of empowerment
programs during the 1990s needs to take into consideration four key dimensions of power. The first three
dimensions of their model are based on Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional model of power. Hardy and
Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998: 452-3) argue: ‘.. power is exercised, in the first dimension, by using various
resources to influence the outcome of decision-making processes, in the second dimension, by controlling
access to those processes, and, in the third dimension, through hegemonic processes, by which we mean
the legitimation of power through cultural and normative assumptions’.
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Representatives of the first pluralistic dimension focus on specific outcomes of decision-making
processes (e.g. reaching consensus on critical business issues). Their findings are based on concrete,
observable behaviour, often with the underlying assumption of the existence of observable conflict of
interests. The second dimension expands the one-dimensional view by including non-decision making in
its reflection. Non-decision-making is seen as ‘a means by which demands for change ... can be
suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert, or killed before they gain access to the relevant
decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementation
stage of the policy process’ (Lukes, 1974: 44). For proponents of the two-dimensional view, control of the
agenda and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process is a critical power
issue. The one- and two-dimensional views fail to include social forces in their explanation. They fall
short in conceptualising organisational power and politics in their complexity and embeddedness within
an organisation, and their dependence on structures, cultures, norms, expectations and the historical
context (Buchanan and Badham, 1999; Thomas, 1994). The three-dimensional view of power includes
individuals as well as collectives (e.g. in the form of social forces or institutional practices) in
explanations about decision-making and control over the political agenda. It explains not only how
political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues but also the social factors involved in
preventing such demands from being recognised and considered in the first place. Hardy and LeibaO’Sullivan (1998) note that Lukes extends analysis into the way in which the more powerful groups or
institutions impose a 'hegemony' over the thoughts and consciousness of the less powerful, such that a
challenge to power and authority becomes, literally, 'inconceivable'.
While Lukes usefully focuses our attention onto this often unrecognised area of 'covert' or 'unobtrusive'
power, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) argue that there remains a fourth dimension that he ignores.
This Foucauldian-based dimension refers to the complex, multifaceted, and pervasive exercise of power
in a way in which no one can control or escape from the power relations. It asserts that there is no
isolated agent of power and draws attention to the limitations of resistance. Power and politics in HRM
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are embedded in our system of being. A corollary is that resisting extant webs of power make alternative
discourses ‘difficult to conceive of, let alone enact’ (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998: 460).
We have argued that any further analysis of innovation and HRM issues and practices needs to investigate
the role of power and politics in preventing many HRM issues from being considered and acted on. The
work of Legge, Pettigrew and Townley provide us with some of the frameworks and tools necessary to
explore what Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) characterise as the four dimensions of the exercise of
power and politics. To briefly illustrate, at Eurotech, all four dimensions came into play.

The TMD

explicitly restricted the role of the HRM department so as to keep strategic powers in his own hands. The
concern of the CE Project Team members with HRM issues was not voiced by them until the CE Project
Team Leader was no longer present. The technical and engineering mindset, skills and careers of many
of the engineers and functional managers directed their attention onto the technical methodologies and
solutions for introducing CE with little interest in or ability to explore the HRM dimensions of an
organisational CE solution.

Finally, both strategic HRM 'supporters' (external CE consultants and

programs, parent company strategic HRM, internal groups and practices etc.) and 'opponents' (internal
'silo' based cultures and practices etc.) were multiple and fragmented in character, with contesting actors,
discourses and practices struggling for dominance.
This paper has sought to act as a bridge to encourage more research and reflection on such issues.
Beginning with evidence of the neglect of HRM issues in the study of innovation process, it has
documented how such issues were addressed in the case of a specific innovation process (an attempt to
CE) at Eurotech, extended this analysis into an examination of how power and politics operates to
exclude some HRM issues from being considered and implemented, and continues to argue for a more
thorough and systematic exploration of such issues in undertaking further research on HRM and
innovation. A four dimensional analysis is a useful and crucial starting point for such an enterprise.
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